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Presentism and Eternalism 
Presentists say that only the present is real. Eternalists say that other times are equally 
real. Equivalently, presentists say that the only real (temporally locatable) things that 
there are, are ones that presently exist. Eternalists say that there are DD(temporally 
locatable)DD things existent at other times that are equally real. Since to be real is just to 
be, the presentist‟s position is just that everything (temporally locatable) that there is 
exists now. The eternalist‟s position is that this is not so. Since „everything that there is‟ 
just means „everything‟, the presentist‟s position is just that everything (temporally 
locatable) exists now. The eternalist‟s position is the denial of this claim -- that there are 
(temporally locatable) things that do not presently exist, i.e. that there are more 
IItemporally locatableII things than there are at present. But it is trivially true that 
everything DD(temporally locatable)DD that exists now exists now, so the eternalist will 
not deny it.  And it is obviously false that there never have been and never will be things 
other than those that exist now, so the presentist will not affirm it. So exactly what is in 
contention between the presentist and the eternalist? 
 The debate between the actualist and the possibilist is analogous, as frequently 
noted (Sider 2001). Actualists say that only the actual world is real. Possibilists say that 
other possible worlds are equally real. Equivalently, actualists say that the only real 
things that there are are actual existents. Possibilists say that there are things in other 
possible worlds that are equally real. Since to be real is just to be, the actualist‟s position 
is just that everything (possible) that there is actually exists. The possibilist‟s position is 
that this is not so. Since „everything that there is‟ just means „everything‟ the actualist‟s 
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position is just that everything (possible) is actual. The possibilist‟s position is the denial 
of this claim – that there are possible things that do not actually exist, i.e. that there are 
more IIpossibleII things than there actually are. But it is trivially true that everything 
DD(possible)DD that actually exists is actual, so the possibilist will not deny it. And it is 
obviously false that there could not have been things other than those there actually are, 
so the actualist will not affirm it. So exactly what is in contention between the actualist 
and the possibilist? 
 I wish to suggest that we pursue the analogy between these debates more strictly 
than is usual. Attending to the clarification of the latter debate which Lewis gives, I offer 
a way of characterising what is at the core of the dispute between presentists and 
eternalists that is immune to worries often raised about the substantiality of their debate 
(Crisp 2004). According to Lewis what is neither trivially true nor obviously false is that 
everything (simpliciter) which is possible is actual. Likewise, I suggest, it is neither 
trivially true nor obviously false that everything (simpliciter) which is temporally 
locatable is presently existent. 
In response to the worries about the substantiality of the debate between 
presentists and eternalists Sider (2001: 15) argues that there is a genuine disagreement 
between the two over set existence. The eternalist will affirm – on the basis of his 
commonplace historical knowledge that there are now computers, and were once 
dinosaurs, although they never coexisted – the existence of a set containing a dinosaur 
and a computer, whilst the presentist will deny that this is entailed (though he may, if he 
has weird enough historical beliefs, e.g., that the Loch Ness monster now exists and is a 
dinosaur or that the dinosaurs were wiped out by an advanced computer-using alien 
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civilization, accept that in fact there is now or was once such a set). This does, I believe,
i
 
identify a locus of disagreement, but it does not, I think, locate the core of the dispute. 
Consider the modal case. Define a „lonely‟ man/woman as a man/woman without any 
female/male worldmate, i.e., on Lewis‟s account not (analogically) spatiotemporally 
related to any woman/man. The Lewisean possibilist will affirm – on the basis of his 
commonplace modal knowledge that there could have been a lonely man, and there could 
have been a lonely woman, but there could not have been both a lonely man and a lonely 
woman – the existence of a set containing a lonely man and a lonely woman, whilst his 
actualist opponent will deny the entailment (though he may, if he has weird enough 
modal beliefs, e.g., that contradictions are or can be true, accept that there actually is or 
could have been such a set). This is a genuine disagreement between the two. But this 
disagreement between the two about set existence is hardly at the core of the debate 
between Lewis and his opponent. This is whether the possible but non-actual existence 
of, e.g., talking donkeys, requires the existence of concrete objects not spatiotemporally 
related to us. From the philosophical contention that this is so, together with the common-
sense platitude that there actually are not, but might have been, talking donkeys, the 
Lewisean infers the existence of  objects spatiotemporally unrelated to us and hence a 
plurality of worlds.  
My suggestion below is that the core of the eternalist/presentist debate must be 
analogously located. 
 To a first approximation (see below for refinement)
ii
 actualism can be 
characterized as follows. 
 There is a slogan: 
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1Act) „Everything is actual‟ (or „The only things that exist are things that actually 
exist‟ or „Only actual things exist‟, or „Only the actual exists‟). 
 There is anti-Lewisean actualism: 
 2Act) Everything concrete
iii
 is spatiotemporally related to me. 
 And there is (what I will call) Megarian actualism: 
 3Act) Nothing is possibly the case that is not actually the case. 
 Possibilism can be characterized as follows. 
There is a slogan: 
1Poss) „Not everything is actual‟ (or „It is not that case that only actual things 
exist‟, „It is not the case that only the actual exists‟). 
There is Lewisean possibilism (genuine modal realism): 
2Poss) It is not the case that everything concrete is spatiotemporally related to me 
(for example, there are (talking) donkeys that are not). 
And there is anti-Megarian possibilism: 
3Poss) Some things that are not actually the case are possibly the case. 
Megarian actualism is obviously false and anti-Megarian possibilism obviously 
true. But the debate between anti-Lewisean actualists (i.e., all philosophers of modality 
apart from Lewis himself, including both the ersatzers about possible worlds and those 
who reject possible world talk altogether) and the Lewisean possibilist (i.e., Lewis 
himself) is a substantive one.  
However, refinement is necessary here, as noted above. An opponent of Lewis 
may be agnostic about the existence of concrete objects not spatiotemporally related to 
him (he may be willing to learn from the physicists about many worlds), and a Lewisean 
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with a sufficiently restricted view of what is possible may accept that there are no 
concrete objects not spatiotemporally related to him – for his analyis of modality does not 
commit him to a plurality of worlds. But, as noted, Lewis‟s philosophically contentious 
claim is that the possible but non-actual existence of, e.g., talking donkeys, requires the 
existence of concrete objects not spatiotemporally related to us (which, together with the 
uncontentious claim that talking donkeys are (merely) possible, entails (2Poss)). It is this 
contentious philosophical claim which is best labelled „Lewisean possibilism‟, and it is 
the denial of this contentious claim, rather than the flat-out denial of (2Poss), which is 
better labelled „anti-Lewisean actualism‟ (of course, most actual anti-Lewisean actualists 
also deny (2Poss), and for our purposes it is this joint denial which is best so labelled). 
Nonetheless, because Lewis has given a non-modal characterization of what is at issue 
between the actualist and the possibilist, i.e., the merely possible, namely „that which is 
in no way spatiotemporally related to me‟ (equivalently: because he has given a non-
modal characterization of the worldmate relation),
iv
 it is a substantive question whether 
anything answers to this characterization, or has to answer to it in order for assertions of 
mere possibility to be correct.
v
 (Another way of seeing the significance of Lewis‟s 
cashing out of the distinction between the actual and the merely possible in non-modal 
terms is to see how it enables him to avoid the charge that his modal realism consists in 
the denial of an analytic truth – that everything there is is actual (Lewis 1986: 99-101). 
Commonsense has it both that all donkeys (i.e., all the donkeys that there are) are actual 
concrete existents and that all actual concrete existents are spatiotemporally related to us. 
But both these opinions cannot be analytic, since it is not analytic that all donkeys are 
spatiotemporally related to us. Thus by denying this Lewis can distinguish himself from 
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his opponents without descending into analytic falsehood. Mutatis mutandis the non-
temporal cashing out of the notion of the present given below eliminates the worry that 
eternalism is just an analytic falsehood.)
vi
 
We can approach the debate between the presentist and the eternalist with this 
framework in mind and give characterizations of what I shall call anti-*Lewisean* 
presentism and *Lewisean* eternalism. (Of course, the *Lewisean* eternalist has more 
work to do than the Lewisean possibilist, since the merely possible does not divide into 
two realms, but the eternalist has to explain the divide between present and future; 
whether he can do so in wholly non-temporal terms or needs to appeal to an irreducibly 
temporal B relation (later than or its converse) is another question. In fact, we need to 
distinguish between the mere denial of anti-*Lewisean* presentism, which is a position a 
„growing block‟ theorist could espouse, and „*Lewisean* eternalism proper, which 
accords equal reality to past and future. But that distinction is not my topic, so I shall 
continue to write of *Lewisean* eternalism where what I mean is strictly only the denial 
of anti-*Lewisean* presentism.) 
 Consider first presentism. 
There is a slogan: 
1Pres) „Everything is present‟ (or „The only things that exist are the things that 
exist at present‟ or „Only present things exist‟ or „Only the present exists‟) 
There is anti-*Lewisean* presentism: 
2Pres) Everything concrete
vii
 is spatially related to me
viii
 
And there is Megarian presentism: 
3Pres) Nothing is ever the case that is not now the case 
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Next consider eternalism. 
There is a slogan: 
1Eter) „Not everything is present‟ (or „It is not the case that only present things 
exist‟ or „It is not case that only the present exists‟) 
There is *Lewisean* eternalism: 
2Eter) It is not the case that everything concrete is spatially related to me (for 
example, there are dinosaurs that aren‟t)ix 
And there is anti-Megarian eternalism: 
3Eter) Some things that are not now the case are sometime the case. 
Megarian presentism is obviously false and anti-Megarian eternalism obviously 
true. (Perhaps there are possible worlds consisting of a single moment, in which I have 
(or my counterpart has) no past or future, but that is not true of this world).
x
 But the 
debate between the anti-*Lewisean* presentist and the *Lewisean* eternalist is a 
substantive one – at least, it is if the debate between the anti-Lewisean actualist and the 
Lewisean possibilist is. (Sometimes the focus of the worry about the substantiality of the 
debate between the presentist and the eternalist is on the question whether there is a 
unitary notion of existence, distinct from „exists now‟ and „exists now, or did exist or will 
exist‟, in terms of which their disagreement about the existence simpliciter of, e.g., 
dinosaurs – whether xDx – can be stated, rather than on the meaning of „present‟. This 
focus is encouraged by the parenthetical versions of the opposing slogans given above – 
which is one reason why the original versions using just the universal quantifier are 
preferable. Mutatis mutandis one might equally well worry, even given Lewis‟s 
explication of the notion of actuality, whether there is a unitary notion of existence, 
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distinct from „actually exists‟ and „actually exists or might have existed‟, in terms of 
which the disagreement between the Lewisean possibilist and the anti-Lewisean actualist 
over the existence simplicter of talking donkeys – whether xTDx – can be stated. Again, 
this worry might be encouraged by the parenthetical versions of the opposing slogans.
xi
 
But I take it that not many people, given Lewis‟s non-modal explication of the actual as 
that which is not spatiotemporally related to us, will regard this worry as a good reason 
for denying the substantiality of the latter debate, or retreating from their incredulous 
rejection of genuine modal realism.)  
Of course, just as in the modal case, refinement and relabelling is necessary here. 
As we saw, an opponent of Lewisean possibilism may be agnostic about the existence of 
talking donkeys not spatiotemporally related to him. But he will say, the possible, though 
non-actual, existence of talking donkeys does not entail the existence of such 
spatiotemporally unrelated talking donkeys, since the possible existence of talking 
donkeys does not entail the existence of talking donkeys. Similarly, an opponent of 
*Lewisean* eternalism may be agnostic about whether there are any dinosaurs not 
spatially related to him. But, he will say, the past-or-future, though non-present, existence 
of dinosaurs does not entail the existence of such spatially unrelated dinosaurs, since the 
past-or-future existence of dinosaurs does not entail the existence of dinosaurs. The 
eternalist will say it does (for his disagreement with the presentist is not just about what 
exists but about the nature of temporality). Thus he faces a compulsory question: since he 
denies that „presently there are dinosaurs‟ is entailed, he must explain what the latter adds 
to the unqualified „there are dinosaurs‟. *Lewis* explains this in wholly non-temporal 
terms. Because he does so, because he gives a non-temporal characterization of the non-
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present, namely „that which is in no way spatially related to me‟ (equivalently: because 
he gives a non-temporal characterization of simultaneity), it is a substantive question 
whether anything answers to this characterization or has to answer to it for assertions of 
merely past or future existence to be correct.
xii
  
It should be noted that, of course, just as the Lewisean possibilist (along with the 
actualist), consistently with his denial of spatiotemporal relations across worlds, can 
endorse the modal proposition „There might have been a talking donkey right here and 
now where I actually am‟xiii, so the *Lewisean* eternalist, along with the presentist, 
consistently with his denial of spatial relations across times, can endorse the tensed 
proposition „A million years ago there were two dinosaurs fighting right here where I 
presently am‟.xiv Similarly, of course, though the *Lewisean* eternalist cannot maintain 
that causally related events must be spatially related, e.g., spatially contiguous, he must 
allow for such common-sense truths as that the (past) short-circuit caused the (present) 
fire. So, of course, must the presentist. So, if necessary, the eternalist can borrow the 
presentist‟s account of this truth. Alternatively, he can offer an account of causation as a 
genuine (non-spatial) relation between events (following Hume, for whom „the great part 
of beings are nowhere‟xv). 
In order to characterize what is at issue between the presentist and eternalist in 
non-temporal terms I have had *Lewis* appeal to the notion of spatial relatedness 
(*„Lewisean* eternalism so understood may be thought of as Galilean eternalism). This 
seems the obvious way to pursue the analogy to the actualist/possibilist debate between 
opponents and defenders of Lewisean genuine modal realism.
xvi
 But one need not pursue 
the analogy in this way. Another possibility is to substitute the notion of causal non-
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connectibility (topological simultaneity) for the notion of spatial relatedness in the 
account. This yields a form of *Lewisean* eternalism we may think of as Einsteinian 
eternalism.
xvii
 (To avoid the consequence that non-actual possible worlds count as present 
we can include spatiotemporal relatedness to us as a necessary condition of presentness.) 
The crucial point is that pursuing the analogy strictly, that is, cashing out the notion of the 
present in non-temporal terms in the way that Lewis cashes out the notion of the actual in 
non-modal terms, gives clear sense to a controversy which otherwise seems deeply 
obscure.  
Of course, anti-*Lewisean* presentism only becomes a definite thesis, rather than 
the mere form of a thesis, once some non-temporal meaning for „present‟ is chosen, just 
as the denial of Lewisean possibilism is only a definite thesis because Lewis has said, in 
non-modal terms, what he means by „actual‟. But my contentions are (i) that any 
presentist must maintain a conjunctive thesis, analogous to anti-Lewisean actualism, of 
the form: „(a) everything which is R-related to anything is R-related to me and (b) the 
truth of past and future tense statements is consistent with (a)‟ – where „R’ is explained in 
non-temporal terms and „me‟ is taken to denote an entity all of whose parts are R-
related,
xviii
 and (ii) when defending (b) he may appeal to resources analogous to those 
employed by the opponents of genuine modal realism – e.g., ersatzism about times or 
primitivism about tense. This is not to say, though, that all the issues are analogous. For 
example, what is presently the case seems not to fix what was or will be the case or, 
indeed, even that there was a past or will be a future (Sider 2001: 37). So the presentist, 
unlike the eternalist – for whom the past is, in a not merely metaphorical sense, „another 
country‟ – needs to explain why it does not, or how, contrary to first appearance, it does. 
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By contrast, what is actual does seem to fix what is possible, so there is no corresponding 
demand on the actualist to save the appearances which the possibilist does not face.  
Again, we do not have names or definite descriptions for other possible worlds or merely 
possible objects, but we do have names and definite descriptions for other times and 
objects that do not exist now – „the twentieth century‟, „five seconds ago‟, „Bertrand 
Russell‟, „the first dog ever born at sea‟, „the man with the biggest nose in the history of 
France‟, „the greatest philosopher living a century ago‟. The presentist must account for 
these. Nor, where there are corresponding battles in the two debates, need it be that they 
must have the same outcome in the two cases.  
In sum: I offer the way of characterising anti-*Lewisean* presentism and 
*Lewisean* eternalism given above as a way of homing in on a substantive issue, strictly 
analogous to the issue between actualists and possibilists if we conceive the latter debate 
in Lewisean terms.
                                                 
i
 Matters are not straightforward, as Sider acknowledges. Most obviously, because neither the eternalist nor 
the presentist need accept the existence of sets. But Sider argues, even if they do not he has still identified a 
locus of disagreement between them since the eternalist will assent to, and the presentist will dissent from, 
the conditional statement „If there were sets, there would/would sometime be a set containing a computer 
and a dinosaur‟. 
ii
 For those who cannot wait: refined actualism is the thesis that (2Act) below is both true and consistent 
with the possibility of concrete things other than those there actually are.  
iii
 Here „concrete‟ may be understood as „bearing spatiotemporal relations‟. 
iv
 Lewis considers other characterizations; what is crucial for him is just that he can characterize the 
worldmate relation in non-modal terms. 
v
 One can be a possibilist without being a Lewisean possibilist. It suffices to hold that, for some reading of 
„F‟ as a predicate of concrete things, the possible but non-actual existence of Fs entails the existence of 
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non-actual entities which are possible Fs. Lewis just adds that the possible Fs are Fs. But my claim is that 
the presentist/eternalist debate is illuminatingly compared to that between the anti-Lewisean actualist and 
the Lewisean possibilist. It is consistent with this that Lewis‟s development of possibilism is just one 
variety, and indeed, that it is a wholly wrong-headed one (perhaps resulting from seeing too great an 
analogy between the modal and temporal cases). Of course the non-Lewisean possibilist must also say in 
what the non-actuality of the non-actual entities which are possible Fs consists. (Why are the non-actual 
entities which are possible talking donkeys non-actual? Not because they are not talking donkeys – nor am 
I.)  He may do so, for example, by saying that they lack, contingently, spatio-temporal properties (rather 
than, as Lewis does, spatio-temporal relatedness to us). This answer also satisfies the desideratum that the 
notion of the non-actual is explained in non-modal terms.  
vi
 A kind of pre-Lewisean modal realism can be envisaged which maintains that possible worlds are 
maximal summations of concrete entities linked by the worldmate relation, and that „actual‟ is an indexical 
denoting us and all our worldmates, but does not include any non-modal clarification of the worldmate 
relation, and, specifically does not give any non-modal necessary condition of things being parts of the 
same world. A defender of this pre-Lewisean position would still be in disagreement with common-sense, 
and would not be a merely ersatz modal realist, since he would insist that the merely possible existence of 
talking donkeys entailed the existence of talking donkeys, and so would accept the existence of talking 
donkeys. But he would not have the resources the real Lewis has to defend himself against the charge of 
embracing an analytic falsehood, that is, to explain why it is not merely analytic that all donkeys are our 
worldmates (namely, because it is not merely analytic that all donkeys are spatiotemporally related to us 
and spatiotemporal relatedness is a necessary condition of belonging to the same world) and so not  merely 
contradictory to conjoin the claim that there are talking donkeys with the claim that there are not actually 
any talking donkeys. This pre-Lewisean modal realism would be, as it were, merely the form of a genuine 
modal realism. Mutatis mutandis, eternalism without any non-temporal cashing out of simultaneity or the 
notion of the present, of the kind considered below, is merely the form of a genuine eternalism, standing to 
what I call immediately below *Lewisean* eternalism as pre-Lewisean modal realism stands to genuine 
modal realism.  
vii
 Here „concrete‟ may be understood as „bearing spatial relations‟ 
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viii
 To avoid having anti-*Lewisean* presentism entail anti-Lewisean actualism (though we might want this 
entailment) we can say instead „Everything concrete that is spatiotemporally related to me is spatially 
related to me‟ or neutrally „Everything concrete that is actual is spatially related to me‟. The definition of 
eternalism will then need to be similarly revised. 
ix
 Just as, in the statement of Lewisean possibilism, the reference of „I‟ must be taken to be to a „world 
bound‟ (or what Lewis himself (1986: 214) calls a „possible‟) individual, i.e., one all of whose parts are 
spatiotemporally related, so, in the statement of *Lewisean* eternalism, the reference of „I‟ must be taken 
to be to a „temporally bound‟ individual, i.e., one all of whose parts are spatially related. The notion of 
parthood employed here in both explications is that of classical mereology.  
x
 I note here the reason for the scare (star) quotes round *Lewisean*: Lewis himself appears to conceive 
presentism, at least in On The Plurality of Worlds, as the obviously false thesis I have called Megarian 
presentism (1986: 204). It is his second discussed solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics, which he 
dismisses as incredible, since no man believes he has no past. (There is another interpretation of Lewis‟s 
discussion here, viz., that he is thinking of presentism as analogous to anti-Lewisean actualism, but, unlike 
anti-Lewisean actualism itself, does not consider it even worthy of refutation. If this interpretation is correct 
I can drop the scare quotes.) 
xi
 Sider (2006: 75) sets up the sceptic‟s case (which he rejects) for the merely verbal character of the debate 
between the presentist and eternalist as follows: „Even the presentist agrees that there once existed 
dinosaurs. So if “exist” in “there exist dinosaurs” means “once existed” everyone agrees that it is true. And 
even the eternalist agrees that there do not now exist dinosaurs. So if “exist” in „there exist dinosaurs‟ 
means “exist now”, then everyone agrees that it is false. Under neither of these two meanings for “exist” 
can there be controversy… What else could “exist” mean?‟ Mutatis mutandis a sceptic about the 
possibilist/actualist debate could argue as follows: „Even the actualist agrees that that there might have 
existed talking donkeys. So if “exist” in “there exist talking donkeys” means “might have existed” then 
everyone agrees it is true. And even the possibilist agrees that there do not actually exist talking donkeys. 
So if “exist” means “actually exist”‟ everyone agrees that it is false. Under neither of these meaning for 
“exist” can there be controversy… What else could “exist” mean?‟ In his (2001: 16) Sider endorses the 
contention I have been emphasizing – that the eternalist/presentist debate is substantive if the 
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possibilist/actualist one is: „the idea that presentists and eternalists do not genuinely disagree … leads to 
denying that … actualists and possibilists genuinely disagree.‟ 
xii
 Can one be an eternalist without being a *Lewisean* eternalist? Does it suffice to be an eternalist to hold 
that, for some reading of „F‟ as a predicate of concrete things, the past-or-future but non-present existence 
of Fs entails the existence of non-present entities which are past-or-future Fs – without going on to add that 
these past-or-future Fs are Fs? This does not seem to me to be in accord with the spirit of eternalism. But 
someone who nonetheless takes this line still faces the question in what the non-presentness of the non-
present entities which are past but not present Fs consists. Why are the non-present entities which are past 
dinosaurs non-present? He may answer this question in non-temporal terms (analogously to the way the 
non-Lewisean possibilist answers the corresponding question about the non-actual in note. v) by saying that 
the non-present is that which lacks, not spatial relatedness to us, but spatiality simpliciter. 
xiii
 As Lewis says: „things that are parts of two worlds may be simultaneous or not, they may be in the same 
or different towns, they may be near or far from one another, in very natural counterpart theoretic senses. 
But these are not genuine spatiotemporal relations across worlds‟ (1986: 71). 
xiv
 It is easier for the eternalist than the possibilist since he can identify ordinary individuals – such as 
planets, cities and cars – with perdurants. So he can say that two temporally separated events happened in 
the same place because, for example, they occurred in the back seat of a certain car (whilst acknowledging 
an equally good sense in which they happened hundreds of miles apart because one happened in 
Manchester and the other in London).  For the reasons Lewis gives, the possibilist cannot identify ordinary 
individuals with trans-world individuals even though, of course, he does not deny the existence of the latter. 
xv
 „I deliver a maxim, which is condemn'd by several metaphysicians, and is esteem'd contrary to the most 
certain principles of human reason. This maxim is that an object may exist, and yet be no where: and I 
assert, that this is not only possible, but that the greatest part of beings do and must exist after this manner. 
An object maybe said to be no where, when its parts are not so situated with respect to each other, as to 
form any figure or quantity; nor the whole with respect to other bodies so as to answer to our notions of 
contiguity or distance. Now this is evidently the case with all our perceptions and objects, except those of 
the sight and feeling.‟ (1978: 235-236) 
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xvi
 Though given special relativity, of course, on this proposal the present shrinks to a space-time point. On 
a Newtonian conception of substantival space, complete with the notion of absolute rest, on the other hand, 
it expands to include everything. In fact, it is hard to see how an eternalist who endorses the Newtonian 
conception of absolute rest can give any account of the present without employing or presupposing 
temporal concepts, that is to say, it is hard to see how he can explain in any non-temporal terms what „there 
are dinosaurs existing now‟ adds to „there are dinosaurs‟ (I assume that causal (non-)connectibility by a 
finitely fast signal is an implicitly temporal notion). 
xvii
 Given special relativity this results in branching within times (cf. Lewis on branching within, versus 
branching of, worlds 1986: 209: in a world that branches there are events a , b and c such that there is no 
space-time interval between b and c, but there is an interval between a and b and one between a and c , 
each of b and c may be in the absolute future of a, but not timelike, spacelike or lightlight separate from 
each other, so for an observer at a there is no such thing as the future). 
xviii
 Otherwise the debate between the presentist and eternalist remains at the level of the pre-Lewisean 
(note vi) debate between actualist and possibilist about the existence of donkeys in other worlds, when no 
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